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Abstract
Reliability and availability have long been considered twin system properties that could be en-
hanced by distribution. Paradoxically, the traditional denitions of these properties do not
recognize the positive impact of recovery|as distinct from simple repair and restart|on re-
liability, nor the negative eect of recovery, and of internetworking of clients and servers, on
availability. As a result of employing the standard denitions, reliability would tend to be
underestimated, and availability overestimated.
We oer revised denitions of these two critical metrics, which we call service reliability
and service availability, that improve the match between their formal expression, and intuitive
meaning. A fortuitous advantage of our approach is that the product of our two metrics yields
a highly meaningful gure of merit for the overall dependability of a system. But techniques
that enhance system dependability exact a performance cost, so we conclude with a cohesive
denition of performability that rewards the system for performance that is delivered to its
client applications, after discounting the following consequences of failure: service denial and
interruption, lost work, and recovery cost.
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1 Introduction
What good is a fast but brittle system? What good is a reliable but slow system? What good is
an available but unreliable system? We could go on, enumerating the eight binary permutations
of three of the most critical descriptors of system value: availability, reliability, and performance,
questioning whether each permutation is meaningful and desirable. But, we are interested in more
than simple enumeration: we would like to examine each of these properties carefully, so as to
ensure that its denition matches the expectations of the system's user. This scrutiny enables
us to rene the denitions of availability and reliability to account for network and service states
that aect the end-user, and to reward software recovery procedures for their positive impact on
reliability. Equally importantly, we elucidate the relationships and trade-os between these pivotal
system qualities, to the point of deriving expressions that quantitatively capture the composite
system features of dependability and performability [19]. Dependability combines availability and
reliability, while performability adds performance to the mix. We believe that any reasonable
comparison between fault-tolerant systems must attempt to measure and compare all of the above
four quantities.
The subject of this paper is becoming increasingly important despite the continuous improve-
ments in the reliability and overall quality of hardware components [11, 16]. A very large distributed
computing system, being composed of a large number of computers and communication links, al-
most always functions with some part of it broken. Over time, only the identity and number
of the failed components change. Failures arise from software bugs, human operator errors, per-
formance overload, severe congestion, magnetic media failures, electronic component failures, or
malicious subversion [7]. Additionally, scheduled maintenance and environmental disasters such as
res, oods and earthquakes, shut down portions of distributed systems.
We can achieve fault-tolerance by recovering from failures when they occur, or bymasking failures
on-the-y. In the recovery approach, failed components are repaired or replaced, and once they
become operational, the interrupted services are resumed by recovering as much state information
as needed to enable the system to execute the services to completion. By contrast, the masking
approach prepares for failures by keeping on-line redundant components that replicate the state of
execution of services. Failed components can be replaced or repaired in the background, but service
execution is not interrupted by failures. Failure masking is expensive, however, and is sometimes
not available as a design option. Moreover, under large extents of failures (e.g., total failures), and
under particular types of failures (e.g., network partitioning), failure masking may be inadequate
to achieve fault-tolerance.
From the point of view of applications, it matters not what the sources of failures are, nor
the design schemes employed to combat them; what matters is the end result in terms of the
reliability and availability properties of the distributed system services these applications need. The
widespread use of mission-critical applications in areas such as banking and OLTP, manufacturing,
video conferencing, air trac control, and space exploration has demonstrated a great need for
highly available and reliable computing systems. These systems typically have their resources
geographically distributed, and are required to remain available for use with very high probability
at all times. Long-lived computations and long-term data storage place the additional burden of
reliability.
We extend the notion of reliability to require that, either the system not fail at all for a given
length of time|which is the standard denition|or that it recover enough state information after
a failure for it to resume its service as if it was not interrupted. This denition, which we call
service reliability diers from the traditional denition in that the latter does not reward recovery
by accounting for its positive eect on reliabilty, as perceived by the user. We say that, for a system
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to be reliable, either its failures must be rare, or the system must be capable of fully recovering
from them. The dierence between the full recovery required to enhance reliability, and the fast
restart needed to heighten availability, is that recovery must reconstruct the state of the service
after failures to what it was just before the failure. Activities interrupted by the failure can thus
be resumed exactly as if no failure had occurred.
In the classical denition, a system is highly available if the fraction of its down-time is very
small, either because failures are rare, or because it can restart very quickly after a failure. However,
as a result of recovery activity after a repair, system services may not become accessible to users
immediately after restoration to an operational state. We therefore deviate from the classical
denition by stressing a more relevant measure, which we call service availability.
Given our views on how availability and reliability should be dened, much of the commonly
construed relationships between both denitions simply vanishes. Under the classical denitions,
availability is always a superior quality to reliability; it is simply an enhanced measure of reliability
with lifetime being augmented by the repair process. Under our denitions, however, availability
does not always relate to reliability. The superiority relationship holds only up till the occurrence
of the rst failure. This will become apparent in Section 5.
A reliable system is not necessarily highly available. For example, a reliable system that over-
comes frequent failures by always recovering, and always completing all operations in progress, will
spend a signicant amount of time performing the recovery procedure, during which the system
may deny new service requests. Another example is a system that is periodically brought down
to perform backup procedures that facilitate future recovery. During the backup, which is done
to enhance the reliability of the data storage operation, the system is not available to initiate the
storage of new data.
Conversely, a system that does not use recovery can be highly available, but not necessarily reli-
able. For instance, a system that restarts itself quickly upon failures, without performing recovery
actions, is more available than a system that performs recovery. Yet, the absence of recovery will
render the system less reliable, especially if the failure has interrupted ongoing operations. Another
available but unreliable system is one without any down time due to backups, because it is not
backed up at all.
An important question, whose answer determines the end-user requirements of the system, is:
which is more signicant? For frequently submitted, short duration operations, availability may be
more signicant than reliability, given the very low probability of a failure interrupting the small
duration of activity. Such operations are therefore better served by a high probability of being
admitted into the system, than by a long time to failure. For long duration, relatively infrequently
requested, services and long-running transactions, reliability represents a property more critical
than availability. A highly available system can be useless for a very long duration service that is
always admitted into the system, but never completes successfully because it is unable to run long
enough before a failure aborts it in mid-stream.
In this paper, we quantify the eect of recovery on reliability and availability. We also address
systems whose mixed workload requires both reliability and availability. In this case, a composite
measure can more eectively assist the end-user in specifying the requirements of the system.
We dene dependability as the product of our rened reliability and availability, because their
multiplication yields the probability that a service can be both initiated successfully, and terminated
correctly. Also, we address complex systems that sustain partial states of failure (as opposed to
either up or down binary states), in which case the system's performance degrades even though its
full range of functionality remains intact. In these systems, reliability and availability denitions
are not directly utilizable in a straightforward manner. To capture partial failures, we dene system
performability that rewards the system for every interval of time it is operational, at a reward rate
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proportional to its level of performance during that interval.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe how systems fail. We enumerate
the various sources of failures and characterize the failure and operational states of a distributed
system. Section 3 introduces our rened denition of reliability, which we call service reliability and
compares it to the classical denition of reliability. Similarly Section 4 presents service availability
and contrasts it against the classical denition of availability. In Section 5, a brief derivation
of dependability is presented, followed in Section 6 by a similar, more elaborate derivation of
performability. Finally, a conclusion and a discussion are presented in Section 7.
2 How systems respond to failure
The rich variety of possible failure events and system responses to them gives rise to an equally
wide range of system states that are relevant to its ability to accept and successfully carry out
its tasks. Figure 1 shows the system states that we distinguish in this paper, and their structure.
The states are hierarchically categorized as operational or failed. An operational state is further
classied into recovering or ready. That is, a system can be operational but not quite ready to be
accessed, as it performs recovery procedures. A ready state is classied, in turn, into accessible and
inaccessible. For example, a system can be ready to accept requests, but network failure renders
the system inaccessible to some, or all, potential clients. Similarly, a failed state is either dead or
under{repair. An under{repair state is further subdivided into recoverable and nonrecoverable. In
the former state, repair or replacement as well as recovery procedures are used to resume the state
the system was in right before the failure. In the latter state, only restart is possible through repair
or replacement.
accessible
recoverable nonrecoverable
recovering
dead
repair,
replacerepair,
replace
recovery
failed
operational
failure
inaccessible
ready
net failure net repair
under-repair
masked failure
Figure 1: Failure states of a distributed system.
For a particular failure state, we dene corresponding probabilistic events that take place in-
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stantaneously or over a time-interval. For a state Q, Q(t) denotes the event that the system is in
state Q at time t, and Q(t; t
0
) denotes the event of the system being in state Q continuously in the
time interval [t; t
0
]. We use this notation throughout the paper.
3 Reliability
With the emergence of critical business applications such as global commerce, and with the advent
of mission critical systems (like the space shuttle), the traditional denition of reliability needs to
be extended to account for systems that commit to completing a system operation despite failures,
once the operation is accepted by the system. In pursuit of such a commitment, a reliable system
will take all needed recovery actions after a failure occurs, to detect it, restore operation and
system states, and resume the processing of the temporarily interrupted tasks. Unfortunately, the
traditional denition of reliability does not reward recovery actions. It only captures the ability
of the system to operate continuously without interruption. Realizing that the eld has not yet
produced unied metrics to quantify recovery-enhanced reliability, we make an attempt in that
direction. First, we review the standard denition of reliability then rene it and rename it as
system reliability, R
y
. Second, we propose a new denition of reliability, which we dub service
reliability, R
s
, that is similar in spirit to task-based reliability [15].
System Reliability
Reliability refers to the ability of the system to operate continuously without interruption. By
tradition, reliability is dened as the probability that the system functions properly and continuously
in the interval [0;  ], assuming that it was operational at time 0. We call this property system
reliability, R
y
. In a system without repair, R
y
() is the probability that the system's lifetime
exceeds  . Given the time-to-failure cumulative probability distribution function, F (x), we can
write R
y
() = 1 F (), where F () is the probability that the time-to-failure is less than, or equal
to,  .
A system is perfectly reliable if it never fails. This can be attributed to the unlikely event that
the constituent components are themselves perfectly reliable and the system's design suers from
no latent errors, or it can arise from the more likely event that component failures are masked so
that they don't prevent the system as a whole from completing an ongoing service.
We rene system reliability so that: (1) it is dened starting from any point t in time, instead
of from time 0, and (2) it is conditioned explicitly on the system being operational at time t. Thus,
R
y
(t; ) is the conditional probability that the system does not fail in the interval [t; t +  ], given
that it is operational to start with, at time t. This denition is only slightly more general than
the traditional denition, but allows us to tie it smoothly with availability, as shown in Section 5.
Formally,
R
y
(t; ) = Pr [ready(t; t+ ) n ready(t)];
where ready(t; t
0
) is the event of the system being continuously in the ready state from time t to t
0
.
Service Reliability
From the point of view of the service requester, it is not always necessary that the system run
continuously, for the requested service to be completed successfully. Our notion of service reliability,
R
s
, reects the ability of the system to complete successfully a service, even in the presence of
failures, given that the system accepted the service request in the rst place. Successful completion
can certainly be achieved by a perfectly reliable system, but it can also be attained more realistically
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and cheaply, by a system that can detect, repair, and recover from component failures and design
errors. We dene service reliability, R
s
(t; ) as the conditional probability that a request for service
s that requires  time units to complete, be successfully nished by the system at some time
t
0
 t +  , given that s was properly initiated at time t. If the system experiences no failures in
the interval [t; t+  ], then t
0
= t+  . However, we allow the system to accumulate the requisite 
units of execution time by aggregating work performed in-between failures, so long as the system
is able to recover from each of these failures. When failures interrupt the processing of s, we have
t
0
> t+  , to account for downtime, repair time, recovery time, and any work done just before the
failure that is lost.
From the above discussion, it follows immediately that, in a system that does not employ
recovery,
R
s
(t; ) = R
y
(t; ); (1)
but that, when recovery's contribution to reliability is accounted for, we have
R
s
(t; )  R
y
(t; ): (2)
An accurate formalization of R
s
that captures the recovery aspect of the system must account for
two random phenomena: the recoverability of failures, and the ability of the system to accumulate
at least  time units before it fails fatally. Certain types of failures can be fatal, or unrecoverable,
such as undetected malicious subversion, failures of the recovery subsystem itself, and catastrophic
failures that wipe out all resources that may be used for repair or replacement. Let U
i
(t) denote
the uptime between the recovery from f
i 1
, the (i  1)st failure after time t, and f
i
, the ith failure.
If failure f
i 1
is unrecoverable, then U
k
(t) = 0, for all k  i. We can now dene service reliability,
assuming that no work is lost and that the system is restored to its full capacity, when a failure is
recovered from:
R
s
(t; ) = Pr
"
X
i
U
i
(t)   n ready(t)
#
: (3)
In other words, service reliability is the conditional probability that the system will eventually be
able to accumulate enough uptime to perform the  units of time required by service s, given that
the system was available to start work on s at time t. Since not all failures are recoverable, R
s
(t; )
must decay as a function of  . As  increases, more failures are likely to occur, and the probability
that a fatal unrecoverable failure will strike grows. Conversely, R
s
(t; 0) = 1, always.
The conditional probability in the denition limits R
s
to the case in which the system is op-
erational at time t and the service is admitted to the system. This excludes the situation where
the system is in a failure state at time t, or is recovering at time t after being repaired. This is
not an arbitrary choice, for the fundamental intuition underlying reliability focuses on the system's
capacity to nish what it starts.
As an example, we calculate R
s
in the simple case where execution of s can be interrupted by
at most one failure, then generalize our analysis to any number of failures. Figure 2 shows the case
of the one failure occuring, which must necessarily happen before t +  to have any eect on the
service s that is assumed to have begun at time t. Assume that all fU
i
(t)g are independent random
variables with identical stationary (time-independent) cumulative distributions F (u) = Pr [U  u].
R
s
(t; ) = Pr [U
1
(t)   or fU
1
(t) <  and U
1
(t) + U
2
(t)   and f
1
recoverableg]
= Pr [U   or fU <  and 2U   and f
1
recoverableg]
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2
Figure 2: An example execution that is interrupted by one failure.
= Pr

U   or


2
 U <  and f
1
recoverable

= 1  F () + c 

F ()  F


2

; (4)
where c is the probability that a failure is recoverable
1
. Noting that R
y
(t; ) = 1 F (), we express
R
s
in terms of R
y
and c, using R() as a shorthand for R
y
(t; ) to avoid clutter.
R
s
(t; ) = c  R


2

+ (1  c) R(); (5)
when at most one failure can occur. In general, for an arbitrary number of n or fewer failures,
R
s
(t; ) = R() + c 

R


2

 R()

+   + c
n


R


n+ 1

 R


n

= c
n
 R


n+ 1

+ (1  c) 
n
X
k=1
c
k 1
R


k

 c
n
 R


n+ 1

+ (1  c
n
) R() (6)
The above formulae yield insight into the relationship between our denition of service reliability
and that of system reliability. In the case of a system that cannot recover from any failure, c = 0,
and R
s
(t; ) = R(), as would be expected. At the other extreme, a perfectly recoverable system
has c = 1, which yields perfect service reliability: R
s
(t; ) ! R(0) = 1, as n ! 1, no matter
how low system reliability may be. In the region that lies between these two extremes, we rely for
our interpretation on the fact that R(=2)  R() always. As the failure coverage of the recovery
component of a system increases, so does c, which can dramatically raise service reliability by
allowing the service to aggregate progressively more numerous, and hence smaller and more likely,
uptime intervals (times-to-failure).
For very long missions, where  can be so large that R() becomes negligible, our formulation
quanties the precise advantage to be gained by recovery, in rendering the eective reliability (i.e.,
service reliability) acceptable. Recovery can, measurably and dramatically reduce the coupling
between mission duration and system lifetime.
1
The quantity c is sometimes called coverage.
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The above analysis and discussion illustrates how our denition of service reliabilityR
s
recognizes
the impact of repair and recovery processes on reliability, by rewarding the ability to recover from
a high percentage of failures. At the same time, R
s
preserves and reects any improvements in
system reliability, although the quantitative extent to which such gains contribute to R
s
is inversely
proportional to the quality of the recovery subsystem!
4 Availability
Availability refers to the accessibility of the system to users. A system is available if its users'
requests for service are accepted at the time of their submission. Unlike reliability, availability
is instantaneous. The former focuses on the duration of time a system is expected to remain in
continuous operation|or eectively so in the case of recovery-enhanced reliability|starting in a
normal state of operation. The latter concentrates on the fraction of time instants where the system
is operational in the sense of being accessible to the end user.
System and Service Availability
The traditional denition of availability captures only overall failure and repair characteristics of
the distributed system hardware. It neither captures the readiness of the system to perform a
particular operation or service, nor the system's accessibility over the network. This can lead
to overestimating the availability of systems that may not always be ready to accept new service
requests when operational, e.g., systems that use recovery to enhance reliability. During recovery,
new service requests may be blocked while the system is necessarily operational and accessible.
Furthermore, if the \system" is narrowly construed to contain the minimal set of server and network
resources that is sucient for proper operation, then it is still possible for the rest of the network
may experience diculties that prevent communication between clients and the system. As a result,
availability can degrade well beyond the estimate of the traditional denition, so far as service users
are concerned.
Availability, therefore, needs to be redened for recovery-enhanced reliable systems that are
internetworked with clients. In this paper, we make an attempt in that direction. We dene service
availability A
s
, and distinguish it from the traditional denition of availability, which we rename as
system availability, and denote it by A
y
. With reference to the state diagram of Figure 1, we write:
A
y
(t) = Pr [operational(t)] (7)
A
s
(t) = Pr [ready(t)] (8)
=
1
t
X
i
U
i
(0; t) (9)
where U
i
(t
1
; t
2
) is the uptime between the recovery from f
i 1
, the (i   1)st failure in the time
interval [t
1
; t
2
], and f
i
, the ith failure in the same interval. In addition, we can also dene customer
availability, which is similar to Larry Raab's site availability [9].
A
c
(t) = Pr [accessible(t)] (10)
All three measures reect instantaneous availability [20]. The denitions immediately imply that
A
c
 A
s
 A
y
, which is what we mean by saying that A
y
overestimates availability. This arises
because system availability A
y
does not reward fast recovery, since the system is already considered
operational once it is repaired, even though it may yet have to recover. Similarly, service availability
ignores the possibility that the system may be ready, but inaccessible to some of its customers.
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Assuming at most one failure can occur in the interval [0; t], we can express A
y
and A
s
with
reference to Figure 2, after setting t 0, and t
0
 t. By following an analysis similar to that used
to express R
s
in Section 3, and writing R(t) as a shorthand for R
y
(0; t).
A
y
(t) = R(t) + [1 R(t)]  [1 R(t  T
r
)] (11)
A
s
(t) = R(t) + [1 R(t)]  [1 R(t  T
r
  T
v
)] (12)
The above expressions seem to indicate that availability improves as t increases, but this is only
because we articially constrained the number of failures to a maximum of one during time interval
[0; t]. What remedies this is the measure, lim
t!1
A(t)|known as the limiting availability|which
can be shown to depend only on the mean time to fail and the mean time to repair,
lim
t!1
A
y
(t) =
U
U + T
r
lim
t!1
A
s
(t) =
U
U + T
r
+ T
v
but not on the nature of the distributions of failure times, repair times [20], or, by analogy, recovery
time.
Service and customer availability as dened above are scalar measures, that necessarily induce
a total ordering on any systems that are compared in these terms. Other measures that are more
complex, but that lead to more detailed design insights, have been proposed in the literature [1,
3, 6, 8, 12, 13]. For example, availability can be measured in a combinatoric sense by the size,
composition, and number of the various alternative sets of resources that suce to keep the system
ready to accept new service requests. Such metrics are invented to help reveal information about
the impact and relative merit of certain design choices and load conditions, such as the number
and placement of replicas, degree of concurrency, transaction length, data access distribution,
operation mix, etc.The scalar and combinatoric availability metrics, however, do not conict, since
it should always be possible, and, we believe, extremely desirable, to compute the scalar metrics
from the combinatoric ones. This enables fair across-the-board comparisons between whole systems,
accounting for such critical phenomena as recovery and failure-prone internetworking of remote
clients with the systems that serve them.
5 Dependability
The overall success of service s depends both on its correct initiation on demand and on its suc-
cessful termination. Therefore, we dene the dependability
2
of s, D
s
(t; ), as the probability of
the conjunction of the two events, that of ready(t) and that of accumulating enough work in the
duration from t to t
0
 t+ to complete the  units of work required by s (as dened in Section 3).
Let T
s
(t; ) denote the latter event. Recall that,
A
s
(t) = Pr [ready(t)]
R
s
(t; ) = Pr [T
s
(t; ) n ready(t)]
Bayes' law of conditional probability dictates that dependability be the product of availability and
reliability, as follows:
D
s
(t; ) = Pr [ready(t) ^ T
s
(t; )]
= A
s
(t) R
s
(t; ) (13)
2
Other researchers include into the notion of dependability additional dimensions such as security against malicious
attack and safety from disasterous consequences of failure.
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So we have in this denition of dependability, the happy coincidence of a single scalar metric that
measures the full initiation-to-termination probability of successful service. We ommit discussion
of customer dependability, except to state that it can be dened, in terms of customer availability
instead of service availability, simply as D
c
(t;  = A
c
(t) R
s
(t; ).
6 Performability
The implicit assumption in the above analysis of availability and reliability is that the relevant
system states are binary: either the system is up and running, or it is not. This simplistic view
does hold true for systems that cannot tolerate failures, but for fault-tolerant systems, many more
system states become important, one for every possible masked failure pattern. Under such partial
failures, the system's performance degrades, even as its full range of functionality remains intact.
One way to measure the consequences is to reward the system for every time unit it is ready, at a
rate proportional to its performance during that interval.
The resulting metric is termed performability, since it combines both performance and depend-
ability [19]. To arrive at a quantitative measure of performability, Y
s
(t; ), we reward the system
for dependable performance in the time interval [t; t
0
] where t
0
 t+  . We denote the reward rate
during that interval by r
s
(g(x)); t  x  t
0
; which is the performance at time x when the system's
failure conguration is g(x). The traditional denition of performability [14, 19, 21] is the simple
integration of the reward function.
1
t
0
  t
Z
t
0
t
r(g(x))dx:
A shortcomming of this denition is that it rewards the system for every subinterval of [t; t
0
] in
which it has a positive reward rate, regardless of whether this subinterval can contribute towards
the successful initiation, and execution to completion, of any service of the system. We prefer to
use the more realistic,
Y
s
(t; ) = D
s
(t; ) 
1
t
0
  t
Z
t
0
t
r(g(x))dx; (14)
whose mean value is
Y
s
(t; ) = A
s
(t)  R
s
(t; )  r A
s
(t) (15)
= [A
s
(t)]
2
 R
s
(t; )  r (16)
where r is the average performance
3
while the system is ready, and r  A
s
(t) is the average per-
formance after discounting downtime. We can view this denition as dependability weighted by
performance, or as performance weighted by dependability. A curious consequence of this denition
is that availability has a higher impact on performability, than reliability does.
Here too, we make only quick mention of customer performability, which emerges by substituting
customer availability A
c
for service availability A
s
in the above formulae.
3
For systems whose steady state probability distribution of failure conguration is stationary, we have r =
P
i

i

r(g
i
), where 
i
is the probability of the system being in partial failure conguration g
i
. Note that this includes only
congurations in which the system is ready, i.e., able to function, albeit at lower performance.
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7 Discussion
In this paper, we revised the classical denitions of reliability and availability. We considered the
positive eect of recovery on reliability, and the potentially negative eect on availability. Our re-
vised denitions, which we call service reliability and service availability improve the match between
their formal expression and intuitive meaning. A natural denition of dependability fortuitously
results from adopting a conditional probability framework. This denition is meaningful in systems
that require both high reliability and high availability, or in which trading o one for the other is
an acceptable route to maximizing dependability. Air trac control systems are a famous exam-
ple [4, 10] that can benet from our dependability metric. Finally, we reformulated the denition
of performability as a composite measure of dependability and performance, for systems that ex-
hibit smooth degradation in performance in response to failures, ranging from fully operational, to
slowly or partially operational, to completely failed. An expression for evaluating performability is
derived, that recognizes the joint contributions of unavailability, unreliability and low performance,
in determining the net level of service that is deliverable to clients of a distributed system.
The ultimate test of a new modelling or evaluation framework rests on whether it inuences
design decisions. Our work paves the way for a systematic trade-o of reliability against availability
in order to optimize dependability or performability, an approach that has proven successful in a
more limited context [17, 18]. For example, consider two dierent recovery subsystems, V;W . V is
more sophisticated, and hence has a higher coverage c
v
> c
w
. By the same token, V takes longer
to recover from a failure, and incurs more overhead during normal operation, thus, A
v
< A
w
,
and r
v
< r
w
. Clearly, if reliability is the only concern, then V is the better choice, but if overall
dependability and performability are computed, it may well turn out to be more advantageous to
adopt W .
The traditional denitions are valuable because of their mathematical tractability, and the large
body of results and software [2, 5] that exists for them. Even though our revised denitions may
prove more dicult for analytic evaluation, they are all directly measurable by simulation and
system monitoring studies
4
. Finally, we note that adding to our suite of denitions, a real-time
deadline interval , such that a request for service submitted at time t must be completed by time
t+  is a straightforward and worthwhile exercise.
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